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ABSTRACT 
Happiness is often seen as the fruit of an easy life, but empirical studies show that happiness can 
go together with considerable hardship. Average happiness is high in current western nations, in 
spite of chronic problems such as criminality, time-pressure and social inequality. Likewise, the 
happiness of the average citizen is not affected by calamities such as the 11 September terrorist 
attack on New York. At the individual level there are also examples of happiness in hardship: the 
happiness of poor and handicapped people is only slightly below average. 
These paradoxical findings can be explained in three ways: one explanation is that they 
do not adequately reflect reality, because of measurement bias or false consciousness. A second 
explanation holds that subjective happiness is insensitive to objective conditions.  A third 
explanation is that we can live with some problems and even flourish when confronted with 
challenge. 
These three explanations are considered in the light of the available evidence. It is 
concluded that the last one fits best. Happiness requires livable conditions, but not Paradise. 
 
 
Many philosophers have associated happiness with trouble-free living. Some 2300 years ago, the 
Greek philosopher Epicure defined happiness as the absence of pain and advised his followers to 
avoid the social rat race and retreat into contemplative communes (Poot 2003). Likewise, the 19th 
century German philosopher Schopenhauer saw happiness as 'not suffering too much' and also 
advised one should live a tranquil solitary life (Schalkxs 2003).  
The idea of happiness as trouble-free living is also common in religious thinking, in 
particular in beliefs that renounce the world. Happiness is seen to have existed in Paradise and is 
expected in Heaven, both sanctuaries from hardship. It is not seen as something that can be 
realised in an earthly existence. At best one can reduce suffering a bit by withdrawing from 
worldly life as much as possible.  
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This view on happiness is also found in utopian fantasy, where the ideal society is 
typically depicted as ordered and without problems. In these earthly paradises there is no social 
conflict, no competition and no jealousy. In Skinner's 'Walden Two', for instance, all such nasty 
troubles have been eradicated by psychological condition techniques (Skinner 1948).  
  
This theory is in fact one of the reasons why many philosophers see little value in 
happiness. A common objection against the utilitarian 'greatest happiness principle' is that 
happiness is mere sullen contentment and that this peace of mind requires a sheltered society, 
such as the technocratic paradise of 'Brave New World'. 'Self-actualisation' is typically mentioned 
as an alternative end-value that promises more pith.   
 
In line with this philosophy, several empirical investigations have tried to demonstrate that 
happiness is antithetical to problems, in particular to social problems. Most of this research was 
instigated by welfare institutions, eager to legitimise their existence. Much to the regret of 
investigators and their commissioners, some of the findings do not fit this theory too well. It 
appears that people can be quite happy, in spite of considerable problems in society and in their 
private lives. These unexpected results have given rise to disenchantment with the concept of 
happiness. They have fuelled doubts about biased measurement and false consciousness and gave 
support to theories that denounce happiness as mere mental illusion. 
 
I will describe this research in more detail below and then entertain the question:  Does this mean 
that happiness is truly illusionary? I start with a quick overview of the field. 
 
 1       STUDY OF HAPPINESS 
Empirical research on happiness started in the 1960’s in several branches of the social sciences. 
In sociology, the study of happiness developed from 'social indicators research'. In this field, 
'subjective' indicators were used to supplement traditional 'objective' indicators and 'happiness' 
became a main subjective indicator of social system performance (Andrews & Withey 1976, 
Campbell 1981). In psychology, the concept was used in the study of mental health. Jahoda 
(1958) saw happiness as a criterion for 'positive mental health' and items on happiness figured in 
the pioneering epidemiological surveys on mental health by Gurin, Veroff & Feld (1960) and 
Bradburn (1969). At that time happiness also figured in the groundbreaking cross-national study 
of 'human concerns' by Cantril (1965) and came to be used as an indicator of 'successful aging' in 
gerontology (Neugarten & Havinghurst 1961). Twenty years later, the concept appeared in 
medical outcome research. Happiness is a common item in questionnaires on 'health related 
quality-of-life' such as the much-used SF-36 (Ware 1996). Lately, economists, such as Oswald 
(1997), Frank (1999) and Frey & Stutzer (2002) have also picked up the issue. 
 The study of happiness has been rapidly institutionalized over the past few years, most 
investigators have joined forces and formed the 'International Society for Quality Of Life Studies 
(ISQOLS1). There is a specialized academic journal, the 'Journal of Happiness Studies'2 and 
research-findings are easily obtainable in the 'World Database of Happiness'3. 
 
1.1    Concept 
Happiness is defined as the degree to which people evaluate their overall quality of present life-
as-a-whole positively. In other words, how much they like the life they live.  
 When we appraise how much we appreciate the life we live, we seem to use two sources of 
information: affectively, we estimate how well we feel generally, and at the cognitive level we com-
pare 'life as it is' with perceived standards of 'how life should be'. The former, affective source of 
information seems to be more important than the latter cognitive one (Veenhoven 1996: 33-35).  
 I refer to these 'subtotals' in the evaluation of life as respectively 'hedonic level of affect' and 
'contentment'. I use the terms 'happiness' or 'life satisfaction' for the comprehensive judgment. These 
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definitions have been delineated in detail in earlier publications (Veenhoven 1984: chapter 2, 
Veenhoven 2000). 
 
 
1.2     Measurement 
Measurement has long been understood to be `objective' and `external' assessment, analogous 
to the measurement of blood pressure by a doctor. By now, we know that happiness cannot be 
measured this way. Steady physiological correlates have not been discovered, and probably 
never will be. Nor have any overt behaviors been found that can be linked consistently to inner 
enjoyment of life.  
 Like most attitudinal phenomena, happiness is only partially reflected in behavior. 
Though some social behaviors tend to be more frequent among the happy, i.e. active, outgoing, 
friendly, such conduct is also observed among some unhappy persons. Likewise, non-verbal 
behaviors such as frequent smiling or enthusiastic movements appear to be only moderately 
related to self-reports of happiness. Consequently, estimates of people’s happiness by their 
peers are often wrong. Suicidal behavior is probably more indicative of unhappiness. Almost 
all people who attempt to or commit suicide are quite unhappy. However, not all the unhappy 
resort to suicide. In fact, only a fraction does. 
 Inference from overt behavior being impossible, when determining degrees happiness 
on unhappiness, we must make do with questioning. That is, simply asking people how much 
they enjoy their life-as-a-whole. Such questions can be posed in various contexts: clinical 
interviews, life-review questionnaires and common survey interviews. The questions can be 
posed in different ways: directly or indirectly, using single or multiple items4. A common 
survey question is: 
 
Taking all together, how happy would you say you are: very happy, quite happy, not very 
happy, not at all happy?   
 
Such questions are commonly used in survey research. The validity and reliability of such 
simple self-reports however is doubted. In earlier publications I have considered the objections 
and inspected the empirical evidence for claims of bias.  I concluded that responses to these 
questions do adequately reflect how much people enjoy their life, though not very precisely. 
For more detail and references, see Veenhoven 1984 chapter 3 and Veenhoven 1998. 
 
1.3     Investigations 
Measurement of happiness is used in an increasing number of investigations. Happiness is now a 
common item in large-scale population surveys, such as the Eurobarometer and the World Value 
Studies. Measurement of happiness also figures in many studies of specific groups, such as single 
mothers, students or lottery-winners. The bulk of these studies revolve around a one-time 
questionnaire, but there are a number that contain follow-up studies and they have even been 
some experimental investigations.  
To date, happiness has been assessed in some 3000 empirical investigations and the 
volume of research on happiness is increasing exponentially. The findings of all this research are 
stored in the above-mentioned World Database of Happiness (WDH 2003), which contains data 
on assessments of how happy people are (distributional findings) and differences in conditions of 
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more and less happy people (correlational findings). These findings are easily accessible on the 
web (www.eur.nl/fsw/research/happiness). 
 
 
2         PARADOXICAL FINDINGS 
Many of the findings are in line with the theory of happiness as living a trouble-free life. Average 
happiness is much lower in nations that are afflicted by poverty, war and injustice than in nations 
that are not. Likewise, individual happiness is lower after personal calamities such as widowhood 
or job loss. Still there are also findings that contradict this theory and suggest that there are also 
some troubles we can live with.   
 
2.1      Happiness in an imperfect society 
Social ills are often mentioned as a source of unhappiness, both chronic social problems and 
sudden crises in society. Yet not all tribulation we read about in the newspapers really afflicts the 
happiness of citizens. 
 
2.1.1   Chronic social problems 
On the political right, criminality is often mentioned as a main threat to happiness, while the left 
stresses persistent inequality. All parties seem to agree that the increasing pace of life reduces 
happiness in modern society. Opinions are strong on this matter, but the empirical evidence is 
surprisingly weak. 
 
Criminality 
There is much concern about crime, in particular about violence. The media reported more on 
matters related to violence and bloodshed in the last decade and murder rates have actually risen 
in several countries. There is widespread public support for safety policies: But does this evil 
really reduce average happiness in the country? 
 One check is to compare happiness in nations that differ in degree of prevalence of 
criminality. A plot of happiness against homicide rates is given in scheme 1. Though there is a 
tendency of lower happiness in the most homicidal nations, the tendency is modest, r = -. 36, and 
is not well visible.  
This unexpected result could be caused by the Latin American nations, where people are 
fairly happy in spite of high homicide rates. Possibly Latin culture involves some compensators 
and thus distorts the big picture. I checked this possibility by considering three parts of the world 
separately, the rich western nations, former communist countries and Latin America. Yet I did 
not find much relation in these subsets (data not shown). Since happiness also depends on the 
economic development of the country I also controlled per head. This reduced the correlation 
even more, the partial correlation is only -.20.  
 Another check is to compare over time and see whether rising homicide rates are followed 
by a decline in happiness. There is no evidence for such a trend, happiness raised somewhat over 
the last decade in most western nations and also in nations reputed to have rising criminality, 
such as the USA. More sophisticated trend analysis may show otherwise, but is unlikely to reveal 
a strong effect. 
There is also much concern about inequality in modern society, and in particular about the 
widening gap between rich and poor. This societal evil is denoted by terms as 'social exclusion' 
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and 'new poverty' and ranks high on the political agenda. Yet again there is little evidence for 
detrimental effects on happiness. 
 A chart of happiness and income inequality in 45 nations in the 1990s is presented in 
scheme 2. In this plot we see again little relation between inequality and happiness. Though 
happiness is indeed high in egalitarian countries such as Denmark it is also high in unequal Latin 
American nations such as Brazil. In this picture the former communist countries combine 
equality with misery. Together this means that the correlation between happiness and income 
equality is zero. Again, various intervening variables may distort this picture. Yet statistical 
control for income per head does not produce the expected negative relationship. Instead, a 
positive correlation emerges, the partial correlation is +.42!  Within country comparisons across 
regions has yielded somewhat different results (Alesina e.a. 2001, Oswald & Blanchflower 
2003), but these effects are small in size. 
 Comparison over time is difficult in this case, since income inequality has not changed 
much over the last decade in affluent nations. In spite of much talk about a growing split in 
society, income inequality appears to have increased only in Britain and the USA (Ritakallio 
2001). Yet happiness did not decrease in either of these countries (Veenhoven 2003).  
 
 Time pressure 
There is good evidence for a growing pace of life in modern society, we spend more hours at 
work and on other scheduled activities and have less free time. This development is usually 
described as harmful. Garhammer (2002) calls it 'time stress' and Schorr's  (1991) bestseller on 
this subject is entitled 'The Overworked American'. A lot of people believe that it is a curse of 
this era. However, the available data do not suggest that this is detrimental for happiness, at least 
not for average happiness in affluent nations.  
A comparison of European nations in the 1990s is given in scheme 3. Happiness is again 
plotted vertically and an indicator of time-pressure horizontally. Instead of the predicted negative 
relationship, we see a positive one, happiness being lowest in relaxed Portugal and highest in 
speedy Sweden. Obviously, this result could be due to intervening factors, such as economic 
affluence and political democracy. Statistical control for such variables does abate the positive 
correlation, but does not reveal the expected negative relationship. 
 Comparison over time does not reveal any harm to happiness either. Though time 
pressure has risen over the last decade, average happiness did not decline; in scheme 4 we can see 
that happiness has raised somewhat in Western Europe since the 1970s. Not only has happiness 
risen, life expectancy is also still on the rise. We get older than ever and also live longer without 
disability (WHR 2002). All this suggests that the growing time-pressure does not really hurt. 
 
 
2.1.2   Sudden crisis  
Possibly we are more vulnerable to unexpected trouble, since we cannot accommodate to this so 
easily and because it undermines the predictability of our existence. Data on this are scarce as 
yet, but the available findings suggest again that we can live with some turmoil in society. 
  
Economic recession 
There is much concern about the effects of economic recession on the individual citizen and these 
miseries are described vividly in the media. It is easy to imagine that recession hurts, it involves 
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bankruptcies, job insecurity and cutting down on consumption, all of which shatter aspirations 
and expectations. Yet again, the impact on overall wellbeing appears to be small in present day 
affluent societies. 
Together with the late Aldi Hagenaars, I took stock of the effects of the 1980-82 
economic recession on the wellbeing of Europeans (Veenhoven 1989). We found that the decline 
of the economy incited worries about finances and job, but did not afflict general wellbeing. In 
some countries there was a short-lived dip in life-satisfaction, but not in all. We did not find any 
rise in stress. Reports of depression and anxiety in surveys did not peak and sales of 
antidepressants and sedatives did not rise. General practitioners registered fewer stress-related 
complaints in the Netherlands and the number of suicides did not rise. 
Possibly recessions have hurt more at other times and in other places, in particular in less 
affluent societies. Still this suffices to demonstrate that setbacks do not always harm happiness. 
  
September 11th 
The unexpected attack on the Twin Towers in New York is another case. Several commentators 
saw this as the end of happiness in the western world, since the event glaringly showed the 
vulnerability of modern society to forces such as terrorism and the unpredictability of history. In 
response, trend analysts searched for evidence of sinking morale, but found very little.  
The trend in happiness in the UK and in Italy since the early 1970s is depicted in scheme 4 
These pictures show no dip in happiness after September 2001. Similar trend graphs for other 
western nations can be found in Veenhoven 2003 and an analysis of Gallup polls in the USA did 
not reveal any dip either (Gallup 2002). 
 
Scheme 4 also depicts some other crises in the late 20th century in these countries. As one can 
see, there is no consistent pattern of reaction. In the UK, happiness dipped after the 1986 
Chernobyl accident, but not after the 1973 oil-crisis, while it also dipped after the successful 
Falkland war. The case of Italy shows no dips after disturbing events at all, but rather a 
continuous rise in happiness. 
 
 
2.2     Happiness in spite of personal misfortune 
At the individual level there are also examples of things hurting less than expected. I present 
some illustrative cases below. 
 
Physical handicaps 
The most illustratory case is the happiness of severely handicapped people; in particular 
paralysed accident victims. Being confined to a hospital bed forever would seem the worst that 
can happen to a person. These people are indeed desperate in the beginning, yet most of them 
adjust after some time. Average happiness in this group remains lower than average, but not as 
low as one would expect. The results of two investigations are summarised in scheme 5. 
 
  
Old age 
A related case is old age. This is typically not seen as the best phase of life, because of the 
inevitable losses involved in growing old. Young adulthood is commonly seen as the happiest 
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time of life (Harris 1977). Yet empirical studies found surprising little relationship between 
happiness and age, scheme 6 shows average life-satisfaction in age groups in Western Europe. At 
first sight there seems to be no difference at all, but on closer inspection one can see a slight U 
pattern. Life-satisfaction is high among adolescents and drops somewhat in adulthood, in 
particular in the thirties. There is a rise around retirement age, which extends into old age. People 
over 80 are most satisfied with life.      
 
 Poverty 
Surprisingly, for economists in particular, the poorest people are not much less happy than the 
richest in affluent societies. This phenomenon is illustrated in the flower chart shown in scheme 7, 
which presents the relationship between happiness and income position in Italy in 1995. As 
one can see, happiness is highest in the medium income brackets and hardly differs between the 
highest and the lowest incomes.  
The differences are greater when intervening variables are taken into account, such as age 
and family situation, but even the most sophisticated studies show modest effect sizes at best 
(Oswald & Blanchflower 2003, Saris 2001). Follow-up studies have shown that changes in 
income affect happiness, in particular income loss. Yet the effects appear to be short lived, even 
in a poor nation like Russia (Schyns 2000).  
 
 
 
These paradoxical findings are dealt with in two ways: one is to denounce them as 
misapprehension; the other is to seek causal mechanisms.  
 
3.1      There is no paradox 
If the paradox is illusionary, the illusion can be both in the perception of happiness and in the 
perception of hardship. There are arguments for both explanations. 
  
3.1.1    Less happy than surveys suggests 
Since the beginning of empirical research on happiness, there have been doubts about the high 
levels reported in general population surveys. Social critics are unwilling to believe that so many 
people really do enjoy life in this unjust society and attribute the findings to false measurement 
and false consciousness. 
 
False measurement 
Several methodological objections have been raised against the unexpected high levels of happiness 
found in western nations. One of the misgivings is that most people have no opinion about their 
satisfaction with life. They will be more aware of how happy they are expected to be, and report this 
instead. Though this may happen incidentally, it appears not to be the rule. Most people know quite 
well whether or not they enjoy life. Eight out of ten Americans think about it every week. Responses 
to questions about happiness tend to be prompt. Non-response to these items tends to be low, both 
absolutely (± 1%) and relatively to other attitudinal questions. `Don't know' responses are also infre-
quent. 
 A related assertion is that respondents mix up how satisfied they actually are, with how 
satisfied other people might think they are, given their life-situation. If so, people considered as 
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being well off would typically report high life-satisfaction, and people regarded as disadvantaged 
should follow suit with low satisfaction-reports. This pattern does occur, but it is not general. For 
instance, in The Netherlands a good education is seen as being required for a good life, but the 
highly educated appear slightly less satisfied with life in comparison to their less educated 
counterparts. 
 Another objection concerns the presence of systematic bias in responses. It is assumed that 
questions on happiness are interpreted correctly, but that the responses are often biased by social 
desirability. There is indeed evidence of some social desirability bias; it has been shown that the 
same people report more happiness in a face-to-face interview than on a written questionnaire. The 
difference is modest however, less than 10% of the scale range. If we take this into account, average 
life-satisfaction in Western Europe would be 6.7 instead of 7.4, which is still above the midpoint of 
this 10-step scale. 
 
False consciousness 
Another qualm is that people are reluctant to acknowledge their unhappiness and therefore make 
themselves believe that they are happier than they actually feel.  
 Some clinical studies have tried to demonstrate such ego-defensive distortion by comparing 
responses to single direct questions with ratings based on depth interviews and projective tests. The 
results are generally not much different. 
 Another test is to compare self-estimates of general happiness with less obtrusive measures 
of mood level. One such measure is the Affect Balance Scale, which involves questions about 
specific affects during the past few weeks. Scores on this scale appear to be highly correlated with 
self-reports of happiness, at the nation level the correlation is +.695. Another method is to measure 
average mood using experience sampling. A study among students found a strong correlation 
(r=+.61) between average mood as assessed by dairy records and an overall estimate of happiness 
(Wessman & Ricks 1965). 
 
The above objections imply that research using these measures to determine happiness will fail to 
find any meaningful correlations; if self-reports of happiness tap mere 'hot air’; there will be little 
correspondence with 'hard' indicators of wellbeing. Yet this is clearly not the case. At the nation 
level, there are high correlations with economic affluence, political freedom and institutional 
quality. The explained variance amounts to some 75% (Veenhoven 1997). At the individual level, 
happiness appears to predict longevity. A long-term follow-up study showed that nuns who were 
happy in their twenties lived about 7 years longer than their sisters who had been unhappy at that 
time in their life (Danner et. al 2001). In this context it is also worth realizing that the high levels 
of happiness in present day society go together with an unprecedented length of life. 
 
  
3.1.2   Life less bad than we think it is 
The paradox can also be in the perception of hardship. The adversities considered may be less 
dire than we think they are. This could be due to over-reporting of bad news in the media and the 
over-emphasizing of hardships by politicians and social scientists.  
The case of criminality is a good example. Newspaper coverage of homicides tripled in 
the USA during the last decade, while the homicide rate actually fell6. Likewise, there has been 
much political hubbub about the 'new poverty' since the 1980s, whilst income differences 
remained largely the same in Western Europe and actually decreased somewhat in France and 
Italy (Ritakallio 2001).  
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There seems to be system in this perceptual distortion. Biologically, we are probably quite 
alert to hazards, since this adds to survival chances. This may be one of the reasons why bad 
news sells. Next there are also institutional incentives for the overstatement of peril; both 
politicians and social scientists earn their living by the exploiting of problems. This can be seen 
to lead into a pattern of 'worried happiness’; because we are alert to potential hazards we cope 
adequately and therefore enjoy life, but we remain aware.  
 
3.2      Paradox has logic 
This brings us to substantive explanations for the observed paradoxes of happiness. One 
explanation holds that subjective happiness is insensitive to objective harm. Another is that we 
can live with quite some troubles and even need the challenge. 
 
3.2.1   Happiness is not sensitive 
The most common explanation for cases of happiness in hardship is that happiness does not really 
depend on external conditions, but is rather produced by internal psychological states. One 
explanation of this kind holds that happiness is 'relative', the other is that happiness is a 'trait'.  
 
3.2.1.1 Happiness is relative 
A common theory of happiness assumes that we compare life-as-it-is to conceptions of how-
life-should-be. Standards of how life-should-be are seen to draw on perceptions of what is 
feasible and what other people have. These standards of comparison are thought to adjust. The 
more money we earn and the more our neighbors have, the higher the amount of money we 
will deem necessary for a decent living.  
 At the individual level, this theory predicts that happiness is a short-lived phenomenon. 
We would be happy when life comes close to an ideal, but in coming closer to that ideal we 
will set higher demands and end up as equally unhappy as before. Likewise, social comparison 
will impede lasting happiness. When we have surpassed the Jones, our reference drifts upward 
to the Smiths, and we feel unhappy again. This theory has many variations. 
 At the societal level, the theory implies that average happiness will fluctuate around a 
neutral level, because individual citizens oscillate between happiness and unhappiness, the 
average will be in between. Social comparison is also likely to result in a neutral average; the 
happiness of the citizens who do better is balanced by the unhappiness of the ones who do 
worse. Consequently, average happiness should be approximately the same in all countries. 
 
Empirical evidence Some often-cited investigations claim support for this theory. Easterlin 
(1974) saw the theory proved by his observation that happiness is as high in poor countries as it 
is in rich countries. Brickman et al (1978) assert that happiness is relative because they found 
that lottery-winners are no happier than paralyzed accident victims are. 
 I have exposed these sensational claims elsewhere (Veenhoven 1991). Average 
happiness is not the same in all nations and does not tend to a neutral level. Happiness appears 
not to be the same in poor and rich nations, but quite different (r=+.64). I also checked some 
other implications of the theory that happiness is relative. One such implication is that changes 
in living-conditions, to the good or the bad, do not lastingly affect the appreciation of life. 
However there is good evidence that we do not adjust to everything; for instance, we do not 
adjust to the misfortune of having a handicapped child or the loss of a spouse. Another 
implication I checked is that earlier hardship favors later happiness. However, survivors of the 
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Holocaust were found to be less happy than Israelis of the same age who were not affected by 
it. All in all, there is no empirical support for the theory that happiness is relative. 
 
Theoretical flaws Proponents of this theory see happiness as a purely cognitive matter and do 
not acknowledge affective experience. They focus on conscious wants and neglect unconscious 
needs. Contrary to `wants', `needs' are not relative. Needs are absolute demands for human 
functioning, which do not adjust to any and all conditions; in fact, they mark the limits of 
human adaptability. Below I will argue that an evaluation of life draws on need-gratification in 
the first place and is therefore not relative7. 
 
3.2.1.2 Happiness is a trait 
Another account for the examples of happiness in hardship holds that happiness is a fixed 
disposition. This theory figures at the individual level and at the societal. 
 
Personal character trait.  The individual level variant sees happiness as a psychological trait; a 
general tendency to like or dislike things. This tendency is seen to stem from inborn 
temperament or early experience. This trait is believed to shape the perception of life-
experiences and the overall evaluation of life. In this view, hardship will not affect happiness 
too much; trait-discontented people will always be disgruntled and the habitually satisfied will 
always see the sunny side of things. 
 I have taken stock of the empirical evidence for this theory elsewhere (Veenhoven 1994, 
1995, Ehrhardt, Saris & Veenhoven 2000). I inspected whether happiness is 1) temporally 
stable, 2) cross-situational consistent and 3) innerly caused. None of these appeared to be the 
case. With respect to the first question, it appeared that happiness does not remain the same 
over time, particularly not over the length of a lifetime. Individuals revise their evaluation of 
life periodically. Consequently happiness changes quite often, both absolutely and relatively 
towards others. Secondly, happiness appears to be sensitive to changes in living-conditions. 
Improvement or deterioration is typically followed by a rise or decline in appreciation of life. 
This appears for instance in the sequel of widowhood and divorce. Lastly I made it clear that 
happiness is not entirely an internal matter. Though evaluations of life are influenced by 
personal characteristics, these inner alignments modify the impact of environmental effects 
rather than determine them. 
 
National character trait The societal variant of this theory (folklore-theory) assumes that 
happiness is part of the national-character. Some cultures would tend to have a gloomy outlook 
on life, whereas others are optimistic. Russia is often mentioned as an example of the former 
kind, and the USA as an example of the latter. In this view, Russia-like cultures remain 
unhappy in spite of prosperity, whilst US-like cultures remain happy in spite of hardship.  
 I have also examined the empirical evidence for this theory (Veenhoven 1994, 1995, 
2001). I first inspected whether the differences in average happiness in nations are indeed 
unrelated to variation in objective quality of living-conditions in these nations. This appeared 
not to be the case. As noted earlier, societal qualities such as economic development and 
political freedom explain about 75% of the variation in average happiness! I next inspected 
whether happiness is lower than expected on the basis of these qualities in nations with a 
reputation for misanthropy, such as France and Russia. This appeared not to be the case. 
Lastly, I considered the happiness of migrants. I compared their appreciation of life with 
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average happiness in the country-of-settlement and with happiness in their country-of-origin. If 
happiness reflects the quality of the conditions one lives in, the happiness of migrants in a 
country must be close to the level of autochthons. If however, happiness is a matter of 
socialized outlook, the happiness of migrants must be closer to the level in their motherland. I 
considered the happiness of first generation migrants in Australia and West Germany. The trait-
theory also failed this test. 
 
3.2.2   Happiness needs no Paradise 
The other explanation holds that subjective happiness depends on objective wellbeing, but that 
we can handle some hardship and even flourish when confronted with challenge. This 
explanation draws on the ‘livability’ theory of happiness (Veenhoven 1995), which is also 
referred to as ‘need theory’ (Lucas & Diener 2000). This explanation can be summarized as 
follows: 
 
Hedonic affect serves as an adaptation compass 
Humans can feel good or bad and this capacity is likely to exist in all mobile organisms. The 
prime biological function of this capacity is to inform the organism whether it is in a livable 
biotope or not. Flora can do without this ability, since it cannot move.  
 
Mood level most. Humans can also differentiate between momentous emotion and general 
background mood. The latter is most informative for deciding whether one is in a good pond. 
Other higher animals, such as cats, also seem to be able to react to how well they generally feel in 
an environment. Unlike cats, humans can reflect on mood and can probably estimate mood level 
over longer periods. 
  
Primacy of affect.  In evolution, this affective orientation capacity preceded the development of 
cognition. The human ability to reason about one’s situation was added to an existing capacity for 
intuitive affective appraisal and did not replace it. Cognition serves a secondary role in 
appraisals. This appears in the fact that affective reactions go before cognitive evaluation (Zajonc 
1980) and that evaluation is not really possible when ones capacity to appraise 'how it feels' is 
impaired.      
 
Happiness draws on hedonic level of affect 
The focus on general mood and primacy of affect also apply also to the overall evaluation of life. 
As noted earlier, happiness judgments draw primarily on affective information, in particular on 
hedonic level of affect. Happiness is not ‘calculated’ by comparing life-as-it-is to standards of 
how-life-should-be, but rather 'inferred' from how well one feels generally. The basic heuristic is 
‘I feel good, hence I am happy’ (Schwartz & Strack 1991). 
    
Happiness linked to needs 
Hedonic level of affect reflects the gratification of basic needs. ‘Needs’ are requirements for 
functioning that are so vital, that evolution has safeguarded their fulfillment by means of hedonic 
signals. There are different need-affect circuits in the human body, for instance separate signal 
systems for monitoring food intake and companionship. The total of these signals is displayed in 
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hedonic mood. Like the green or red lights on some machines, good and bad moods indicate 
whether the organism is thriving well. Unlike emotions, mood does not signal specific problems. 
‘Needs’ should not be mixed up with ‘wants’. Not everything wanted is really needed and 
the pursuit of wants can even be detrimental to need gratification. Needs are given by nature and 
limited in principle. Wants are products of our thinking and as such endless8. Needs are absolute, 
wants are relative (Veenhoven 1991). 
 
Needs for ‘functioning’ requires some challenge 
A main class of needs is ‘functioning needs’. Maslow (1970) referred to this kind as ‘growth 
needs’ or ‘self-actualization needs’. All organisms have a drive to use and develop their 
potentials. The survival value is rather obvious, trained organisms have a better chance than 
untrained ones. Again there seem to be different reward circuits, linked to different capabilities. 
In thinking animals, the need for intellectual stimulation is quite pronounced. The pleasure that 
accompanies fully functioning has been described as ‘flow’ (Csikszentmihalyi 1997). 
In children, the needs for functioning manifest most clearly in play. Children play for fun, 
not for any external reward. In adults, functioning needs move to seeking competition at work 
and challenging leisure activities, such as mountain climbing. Wants often serve as a means to 
keep going and are this is one of the reasons why wants have no limit. 
 
These needs developed in harsh conditions 
The human species did not develop in Paradise, but in the conditions of a hunter-gatherer life in 
the African rift valley. Life was hard in that situation and not very secure. Hence it is likely that 
evolution given rise to an ability to face such adversities. Though reason tells us that it might be 
better to avoid trouble, we nevertheless thrive when putting these abilities to practice. 
 
In several earlier publications I have argued that need theory is the best explanation for the 
observed pattern of happiness (Veenhoven 1991, 1994, 1995, 2000). This theory also provides 
also a plausible explanation for the cases of happiness in hardship presented in this chapter. 
 
3.2.3    In sum 
The various explanations for the paradox of happiness in hardship reviewed in this chapter are 
summarised in scheme 8, it also recapitulates my view of their reality value. Which boils down to 
the conclusion that there is no paradox. The illusion of a paradox is based on over estimation of 
hardship and in false theories of happiness. 
 
 
4       CONCLUSION 
Though happiness calls for livable conditions, we can deal with  hardship and even thrive when 
challenged to cope with it. Paradise is not a prerequisit for happiness. 
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Scheme 1 
Happiness and murder rate in 55 nations in the 1990s 
1997 Homicide per 100.000 - medical registr.
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Scheme 2 
Happiness and income inequality in 52 nations in the 1990s 
1988-95 income inequality (ratio income share richest vs poorest 20%)
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Scheme 3 
Happiness and time pressure in EU nations in the 1990s 
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Scheme 4 
Trends in happiness in two nations 1974-2002 y
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Scheme 5 
Happiness and handicap 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Average Happiness 
 
1. Accident victims, in rehabilitation:   5.9 
Controls:               7.6 
 
2. Disabled for 20 years:     5.0 
General population:     5.4 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Sources: 1) Brickman et. al. 1978, 2): Schulz & Decker, 1985 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scheme 6 
Happiness and Age in 8 EU-nations 1980s 
 
 
 age 
 
Source: Veenhoven & Okma, 1999 
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Scheme 7 
Happiness and income in Italy 1995 
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Scheme 8 
Explanations for paradoxical findings 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
There is no paradox 
 
•  Less happy than surveys suggests 
• False measurement     false 
• False consciousness     false   
 
• Life less bad than we think it is     true 
 
 
Paradox has logic 
 
Happiness not sensitive to any hardship 
• happiness is relative     false 
• happiness is a trait     false  
  
• Happiness needs no Paradise    probable 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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NOTES 
1 International Society for Quality of Life Studies: www.cob.vt.edu/market/isqols 
Next to this social science association, there is a health-science oriented association, named International Society for 
Quality of Life Research: www.isoqol.org 
 
2 Journal Of Happiness Studies: www.wkap.nl/journals/johs 
 
3 World Database of Happiness: www.eur.nl/fsw/research/happiness 
 
4 An overview of acceptable measures of happiness can be found in the World database of Happiness, Catalog of 
happiness Querries, www.eur.nl/fsw/research/happiness/querries. 
 
5 This correlation appears in an analysis of 40 nations in the 1990s, using the dataset 'States of nations' 
(www.eur.nl/fsw/research/happiness/statesofnations) 
 
6 Between 19990 and 1996 the homocide rate dropped from 9.8 to 7.3 in the USA (UN-DY 1993/1998 table 21) 
 
7 The theory applies better to some domain-satisfactions. For instance, income-satisfaction appears to largely a 
matter of comparison, and standards of reference on this matter have been shown to drift (VanPraag 1993). There are 
also indications for comparison processes in satisfaction with health and satisfaction with job. 
 
8 In economy it is commonly stated that 'needs are endless'. This assertion is based on observed buying behaviour 
and concerns in fact 'wants' rather than 'needs'. 
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